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It is generally accepted that new-enterprise formation is critical for generating
growth in post-socialist economies. This process has been intensive in Russia,
with considerable regional variation. In this study, this variation is estimated,
drawing on the theory of conditional and unconditional convergence. It is shown
that in the 1991–1993 period, Russia's regions tended toward convergence, while
from 1994 to 1999 they tended toward divergence, and in regions where this pro-
cess had been weak, it became still weaker. How can mechanisms underlying the
regional variation in the establishment of small enterprises be determined? The
conceptual framework of this study, which seeks to explain the choice of determi-
nants and interpret the obtained results, is focused on two models: a simple
model of relative demand-supply determining the aggregate segment of small
businesses and a model of individuals' rational behavior in the labor market. It is
confirmed that labor demand in the segment of small entrepreneurship depends
on the relation of earnings in new versus wage sector, on the initial savings of the
population and on the population's risk-aversion. Credibility of local governments
and relatively high economic potential of regional institutions stimulated labor de-
mand in the small business segment. An empirical test of the theoretical proposi-
tions is made on the 1990–1992 data.
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regional elite, a system of simultaneous equations.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The reforms in Russia that allowed private entrepreneurship and market
mechanisms brought to light the inefficiency of the large scale of state-
owned monsters. Along with the collapse of long existing enterprises,
there was a surge in the establishment of new private enterprises. They
provided people with self-employment and new sources of incomes. It
was for the first time that people were entitled to run their own business
and use financial planning, which earlier was the exclusive privilege of
state organizations and their officials.
Today, small businesses make up a fairly large sector in the Russian
economy, enjoying special support from state and non-state agencies.
This notwithstanding, new-enterprise formation has slowed lately. The
data of the RF Goskomstat on registered small enterprises show that the
sharp surge in the number of small businesses witnessed in the early
1990-s has changed into stagnation. Why is this so? Does small business
formation vary according to region? And can small business behavior in
Russia be explained through a cross-country comparison?
This study seeks to answer these questions and help federal and re-
gional governments design an efficient policy supporting the formation
and functioning of new enterprises and avoid unprofitable investments.
This study shows the regional variation in the establishment of new en-
terprises and evaluates the trends in this process over the whole period
of reforms. For this purpose the variables used are the number of small
enterprises per thousand inhabitants, the percentage of small business
employment out of total regional employment, and the share of small
business in the total output per industry. In 1991–1993, Russia's regions
showed a tendency toward convergence on the levels of new-enterprise
formation and from 1994 to 1999, these regions tended toward diver-
gence. In regions where the formation was slow, it slowed still more.
An explanation for these trends can be found in the rational behavior of
the individual who makes a decision about opening his or her own busi-
ness. The creation of every small enterprise is the result of an individ-
ual's concrete decision to change his status. Earlier he was a wage
worker, now he becomes an entrepreneur and enters the sector of
self-employment. This change in activity is reasonable if the individual
maximizes his utility. Only an individual with low risk aversion and with
the required starting capital can open his or her own business. These
fairly simple considerations and the assumption that by becoming
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
self-employed, the individual also creates jobs for other people allows
us to switch from the model of individual behavior to the model of ag-
gregate labor demand-supply in the sector of small business and to pre-
dict in what direction particular factors will influence labor demand and
supply.
Empirical estimations given in the study are based on RF Goskomstat
data and working materials of the Ministry of Finance of Russia and on
expert assessments of two data bases — of the "Expert" journal ("Re-
gions of Russia") and of a survey commissioned by the Russian Union of
Producers and Entrepreneurs: "Entrepreneur Climate in Russia's Re-
gions. Geography of Russia for Investors and Entrepreneurs."
The different labor demand in small business is shown to relate to the
regional variation in risk levels ensued from institutional weakness and
conservatism of elite. Different risk expectations determine the different
degree of inhabitants' confidence in the action of business rules. Empiri-
cal estimations confirm the influence of incomes on labor demand-
supply in this sphere. A significant influence is also made by inhabitants'
low risk aversion, their favorable attitude toward democratic reforms and
their availability of starting capital.
What region is friendly to small business formation? At the beginning of
transition it was a region with a high percentage of reform-minded in-
habitants with sufficient initial capital, where the regional elite had re-
formist and rather homogeneous orientation and the authorities have
relatively more budgetary opportunities than other regions. It was a re-
gion where self-employment yielded relatively high incomes compared to
incomes in the public sector. Such an environment is favorable to small
business formation, encourages inhabitants' initiatives, and creates con-
ditions for self-employment.
In forming the regional programs supporting small business formation, it
is necessary to consider the inhabitants' predisposition to entrepreneur-
ship. Russia is a multi-ethnic nation, and some ethnic groups living within
its territory have no cultural traditions in organizing their own businesses.
Encouragement and political declarations are hardly going to be suc-
cessful in bringing about the desired result.
The confidence of inhabitants in the authorities and the political stability
of the region are crucial factors for enterpreneurship. Homogeneity and
cohesion of the regional elite promote entrepreneurship. Personal ambi-
tions of regional leaders can inflict damage on the creation of a friendly
entrepreneurial climate.
The federal government can exert influence on new enterprise creation
in particular regions through its policy of transfers and subsidies and by
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improving budgetary endowments in areas where the local environment
is friendly to small business. Voting scenarios and results of elections
give many-faceted information valuable for making predictions about the
creation of entrepreneurial climate in a region.
Stagnation in small business formation in Russia is regionally differenti-
ated and  explained by the population's low confidence in authorities.
The determinants of this difference are a result of responses to increas-
ing risks, conflicts and controversy of attitudes within the regional elite,
low and unbalanced regional budgets, no advantages of employment in
small enterprises over that in the wage sector, and impoverishment of
the inhabitants in the course of reforms.
These results can be of interest to policy-makers too if they have a real
resolve not to repeat their earlier mistakes in the field of small business
development and to officials who want to show, in action and not in
words, that the state indeed takes an interest in small businesses.
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"Russia will be set on her feet by the spirit
of entrepreneurship, — no other means are available"
V.Leontieff, "Komsomol'skaja pravda"
09.02.1998.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid 1970-s the role of small enterprises in the economic
growth of an industrial society has been re-evaluated. The previous
theoretical paradigm stating that capital is invariably being concentrated
and firms and companies increasing their sizes has not been confirmed
in practice. The OECD studies of six largest countries made by Loveman,
Gary and Werner Sengenberger (1991) have revealed a rise of employ-
ment in small firms.
Similar events have been observed in economies in transition too. At the
cross-national level, it is generally taken as proven that the success of
economic transformation is primarily the result of the formation of new
firms. New enterprises are relatively free of distorted incentives that in-
fluence state-owned enterprises, and are therefore relatively efficient
and responsive to market conditions. The most impressive growth of
small private business was in Czechoslovakia, where before 1989 no le-
gal private enterprises existed. In less than two years, the number of pri-
vate businesses exceeded 1 million per country's population of 15 mil-
lion. In Poland and Hungary, with their more developed private sectors, a
still more substantial growth of new enterprises was observed. Even in
relatively less developed Bulgaria, 460 thousand private enterprises were
registered by mid 1994, i.e., one enterprise per twenty residents.
In Russia structural transformations have been much slower. According
to the Goskomstat data, the number of small firms was 890600 at the
beginning of 2000, that is 6.1 firms per thousand inhabitants. They pro-
duced about 10% of the gross national product and employed 12% of
the total labor force. The low number of small firms implies little compe-
tition, which impedes the formation of a normal market environment and
therefore constrains the economic growth and improvement of living
standards.
In recent years small businesses have begun to be supported by differ-
ent state and non-state structures. At the federal level and in most re-
gions, even special institutes have been created to implement this sup-
port. But their activity is not always based on a deep investigation into
the mechanisms driving the formation of small firms. Thus, in spite of the
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fundamental significance of the regional approaches to small business
support, the economic and political characteristics of individual regions
fail to be taken into consideration. At the same time, initial regional con-
ditions, regional economic structure and institutional factors can mark-
edly influence the process of turbulence (birth and death) of new small
firms. Without a clear idea about the mechanisms that influence the pro-
cess of enterprise formation in different Russian regions, it is impossible
to design an effective policy to promote this process.
The objective of this project is to explore regional factors influencing
new-enterprise formation in Russia, specify regional differences in these
factors and determine which factors can influence these disparities. This
study seeks to answer the following question: what accounts for the dif-
ferences in the emergence of new, small-scale firms in different regions
of Russia?
In the first part of this study, data on regional differentiation in the level
of enterprise development in Russia's regions are cited. On the basis of
the conditional and unconditional convergence theory of Sala-I-Martin
(1996), changes in the number of registered small firms per 1000 popu-
lation in 78 regions of Russia for the period of 1990–1999 are analyzed.
The analysis has revealed a high regional variation in new enterprise
formation. Displayed is not only spatial but also temporal differentiation.
The following sections show how this difference can be explained.
The creation of any small enterprise is the result of an individual's deci-
sion to change his status: if earlier he was an employee, now he be-
comes an entrepreneur and enters the sector of self-employment. The
approach used to analyze regional differences in the enterprise climate
in Russia is based on the theory of choice among labor market sectors.
Taking into account specific features of Russia's transition, we can fur-
ther elaborate the Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) model, building a
model that allows us to move from the model of an individual's behavior,
who by his decision about where to work maximizes his utility, to a model
of aggregate labor demand-supply in the aggregate segment of small
businesses. Such a shift has permitted us to bind basic determinants of
an individual's decision to become self-employed with factors of new
enterprise formation and predict the impact of particular factors on labor
demand and supply.
A survey conducted among entrepreneurs has revealed regional varia-
tions in the level of risk caused by regional institutional weakness and
conservative attitudes of the regional elite. The difference in risk expec-
tation implies a different degree of credibility of the rules in business. A
premium for involvement in small business development or a stimulus to
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become self-employed can be measured by the ratio of earnings in the
small enterprise sector to those in the wage sector.
Low risk-aversion and liberal attitudes of the inhabitants are also very
significant. This is in line with the arguments of Kihlstrom and Laffornt
(1979), who built an exact model of the negative relationship between
risk-aversion and self-employment probability and corroborated their
theoretical conclusions with the empirical data. Unlike Earl and Sakova
(1999), who used questionnaire data and focused on individual motives
for making the shift to self-employment (gender, age, marital status,
parents' occupation, etc.), in the presented model factors influencing the
demand-supply across the whole segment of small businesses were
used. As determinants, different characteristics of local labor markets
and financial sources of entrepreneurship are considered.
This paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 contains data and
background information on new-enterprise formation in Russia in the
1990–1999 period of reformation. It includes calculations and tendencies
of conditional and unconditional convergence of this process. Section 3
is devoted to the analysis of literature. In Section 4 the conceptual
framework needed to explain the choice of determinants and to interpret
the obtained results is considered. In Section 5, a model of relative labor
demand-supply in the aggregate segment of small businesses, which is
a system of simultaneous equations, is developed. The data and empiri-
cal methods used for assessing the system of equations (OLS, 2SLS,
FIML) are described. Section 6 contains the empirical results and Sec-
tion 7, the conclusions.
2. INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
Communist economies had a number of specific features. One of them
was a stark production structure. The number of firms that appeared
and then went bankrupt, the percentage of small firms, the number of
new jobs — all these characteristics that are important for a market
economy had no special meaning for management in countries with a
socialist orientation. The proportions remained unchanged over a long
time (Table 1).
In contrast to this, the beginning of the reformation in Russia not only
permitted private entrepreneurship, but has changed the mechanism de-
termining the size of firms, and with the emergence of market mecha-
nisms the inefficiency of many industrial mega-projects has come to light.
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Table 1. Percentage of the employed in firm with a number of employees, %.
Country Year 20 20–99 100–499 500+
Japan
USA
France
Germany
Great Britain
Russia
1983
1985
1981
1970
1983
1964
1968
1975
1987
35.0
7.4
21.8
21
20.2
23.0
33.4
26.2
2
2.4
1.5
3.2
17.0
33.8
27.1
25.3
27.0
15.8
17.1
20.3
20.1
27.08
38.6
28.1
41.1
46.8
82.2
81.5
78.2
76.7
Co-operatives that were the earliest state-independent small firms began
to appear back in 1986. At that time it was the only possible way to le-
galize private enterprise activity. In the beginning, the dynamics of the
development of co-operatives looks fairly impressive. In 1987 there were
23 co-operatives. Then the development of co-operatives exploded:
January 1988 — 13.2 thousand co-operatives, January 1989 — 77.5
thousand, January 1990 — 193.5 thousand. In two years, their number
increased nearly 15-fold.
Small firms sprang up in 1990 on the basis of the Regulation of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 8, 1990, No 790, "Measures
Toward Formation and Development of Small Enterprises." According to
this regulation, small enterprises are set up in all sectors of the national
economy on the basis of state, collective, and private ownership of So-
viet citizens and other ownership and these enterprises could perform
any activity not forbidden by law.
The main criterion by which this group of enterprises was identified was
the number of employees. In industry and construction, these firms had
up to 200 employees; in other sectors of production, up to 50 employ-
ees; in services, 25 employees; in retail trade, 10 employees.
The criterion for identifying this group of small firms was changed in
1995. According to the Federal Law "On State Support of Small Business
in the Russian Federation" of June 14, 1995, No 88-FZ, it was not only
the number of employees, but also the maximum 25 percent share in
their charter capital of non-small-business entities: commercial struc-
tures (juridical persons) with participation of federal, regional, public and
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religious organizations, charitable and other funds; as to the number of
employees it was not to exceed in the reporting period: in industry, con-
struction and transport — 100 employees, in agriculture and science-
technology — 60 employees, in wholesale trade — 50 employees, in re-
tail trade and consumer facilities — 30 employees, in other sectors and
other activities — 50 employees. Co-operatives and small firms, unlike
state-owned ones, could quickly appear and quickly die. The dynamics
of registered small enterprises in national terms is shown in Fig. 1.
In the first years of reformation there was a fairly great rise in the num-
ber of small firms and consistent positive dynamics. In 1995, a certain
drop in their absolute number was observed, after which the trend stag-
nated.
Regional disparities in the formation of small firms appeared with the be-
ginning of the reforms and can be noted as one of the distinctive fea-
tures of the transition period in Russia along with regional variation in
GRP, average per capita incomes and industrial output. Here are some
examples of these disparities based on the data of economic districts
(Figs 2 and 3).
Still higher differentiation of small business employment can be revealed
in particular federal units. While in 1991 the difference between the
minimum percentage of small business employment (Mordovia) and the
maximum (the Magadan province (Oblast)) was 7 times, in 1992 this
difference became 136 times. Since 1994, the leading territory in the
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Thousands of units
Fig. 1. Number of registered small enterprises in Russia. Source: RF
Goskomstat.
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percentage of small business employment has been Moscow (1994 —
18.3%, 1996 — 23.1%, 1997 — 23.4%).
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Fig. 2. Proportion of small business employment to the annual average
employment in Russian economic districts in 1995–1997.
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0
20
40
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80
Fig. 3. Percentage of small business employment in 1993 across
sectors and administrative districts of Russia (%): 1 — industry, 2 —
construction, 3 — trade and public catering, 4 — science, 5 — share of
small firms in total industrial output of the territories.
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The scales of regional variation in new-enterprise formation can be seen
in comparing the maximum and minimum number of small firms per
thousand population in different regions over the whole period of reforms
(Fig. 4).
In 1991 in the region with the maximum level of entrepreneurship (the
Magadan province), the number of small enterprises per thousand
population was 2.52. The Lipetsk province was the region with the mini-
mum level of enterprise formation. The difference between the maximum
and minimum figures of enterprise formation in the time interval consid-
ered was consistently increasing to reach its maximum level in 1999,
when the difference in the number of small enterprises registered per
thousand population between St. Petersburg and Dagestan (maximum
and minimum levels, respectively) was 22.8 times. It should be noted
that while the group of "backward" regions (those with the minimum
number of small firms per thousand population) each year included dif-
ferent regions (except for Dagestan, which was present in this group
three times during this period), the group of leaders (with the highest
number of small firms) were consistently the Magadan province, Moscow
and St. Petersburg.
Interregional differentiation in the formation of small enterprises can be
measured on the basis of the theory of conditional (σ) and unconditional
0
5
10
15
20
25
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fig. 4. The spread of changes in the number of small enterprises per
thousand population among Russian regions (1991–1999) (max-min).
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(β) convergence of Sala-I-Martin (1996).1 According to this conception,
the process σ of convergence for the group of economies occurs if the
standard deviation of average per capita indicators tends to decrease,
that is σt+T < σt, where σt is the standard deviation, or, using the loga-
rithmic form of the indicator
1/ 2
21 (log )t it ti yn
σ µ = −  ∑ (1)
where:
yit is the per capita indicator in region i in year t, µt is the average value
of log yit.
The analysis of the behavior of the differentiation of Russian regions by
enterprise level was conducted from 1991 to 1999 on the basis of the
Goskomstat data. Enterprise formation was measured by the number of
small firms registered at the beginning of the year per thousand popula-
tion. The information for 1991–1993 was formed on the basis of the data
on small enterprises and co-operatives.
Calculations have shown that in the period from 1991 to 1994, a process
of conditional convergence was observed. Interregional differentiation in
enterprise formation was decreasing. The variation in the number of
small enterprises was decreasing from 0.44 in 1991 to 0.34 in 1994.
From 1995 to 1998, the trend reversed. During this period, a process of
regional divergence is characteristic: regional disparities in enterprise
formation are increasing.
The variation in the number of small enterprises increased from 0.38 in
1995 to 0.48 in 1998. In 1999 a new stage in convergence began. The
standard deviation of the logarithm of the number of small enterprises in
1999 is 0.47.
Note that this trend of regional variation in enterprise formation is in line
with the trend in per capita incomes. The latter indicator was obtained by
Mikheeva (1999) for the 1991–1996 period. Fig. 5 plots the standard de-
viations of logarithms of per capita money incomes (Mikheeva's data)
and enterprise formation in Russia's regions for the period from 1991
to 1999.
                                               
1 A similar approach was used to measure regional, social and economic differen-
tiation in Russia by Mikheeva (1998), where convergence was measured on the
basis of such indicators as per capita GRP, per capita income, and per capita
production.
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The latter observation seems to support the conclusions made by
Berkowitz and DeJong (1998) who discovered a positive correlation of
new enterprises with per capita incomes and thus showed the positive
effect of small enterprises on regional economic growth.
The indicator of unconditional convergence β is used to measure the rate
of convergence (divergence) in the following way.
Let yit be the per capita indicator of the economy i in year t. The conver-
gence rate β is assessed by the following equation:
ln(yiT / yit)/ (T – t) = c – b lnyit + uit, (2)
where c is constant, t and T are the first and the last year of the period
under consideration, respectively, and uit are balances. If b is assessed,
then β is estimated from equation
b = [(1 – e–β (T – t))/(T – t)]. (3)
The estimations made on the basis of new small enterprises per thou-
sand inhabitants for the 1991–1999 period have given β = –0.31, which
corresponds with the high rate of regional divergence by level of new
enterprise formation.
A statistically significant measure of β derived separately for periods
1991–1994 and 1995–1999 could not be obtained.
The value of the unconditional convergence coefficient (divergence in
our case) shows that in those regions where in the initial period there
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
of regional per capita incomes 
of new enterprises 
per thousand inhabitants 
Fig. 5. Standard deviations of logarithms.  
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was a high level of enterprise formation, this process continued rising.
The increase in the rate of divergence in such indicators as per capita
incomes and per capita GRP was found also for the period of 1990–1996
by Mikheeva (1999). Therefore, there are similar trends in the changes
of enterprise formation, per capita incomes and per capita GRP in Rus-
sia's regions.
Our analysis has shown a high differentiation across regions in new-
enterprise-formation, taking into account the temporal component. In the
next sections it will be shown how this difference can be explained on
the basis of the studies made by other authors and by what is really go-
ing on in Russia.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
A detailed study of the literature devoted to small business development
in different countries allows us to identify two lines of inquiry. The first is
formed by authors who approach this problem from the theory of organi-
zation and economy of scales. In these works, as a rule, a different
number of factors (institutional, political, social-economic) promoting the
development of small firms in the economy are revealed. But, in these
works lacking are theoretical models that would permit us to limit the
number of such factors and the number of empirical tests of hypotheses,
leading to an enormous number of different interpretations and explana-
tions.
The influence of the institutional climate on the process of new-
enterprise formation in Eastern and Central European countries and in
Russia has been noted by many authors such as Webster (1992), Back-
berg (1997) who point out to the importance of tax reform, the decrease
of bureaucratic burden and elimination of bureaucratic corruption, the
improvement of judiciary structures and the infrastructure of capital mar-
kets. Other authors, for example Radaiev (1998), who concentrate their
attention on the economic and political instability in the nation emphasize
the influence of "business networks" combining the means of formal
control with informal exchange of services between entrepreneurs.
One of the most recent studies by the World Bank conducted by Bru-
netti, Kisunko, and Weder (1997, 1998) in 69 nations where over 3600
entrepreneurs were surveyed, states: institutional barriers exist in all
countries, but the significance of individual factors is different. Corrup-
tion, crime and embezzlement as well as a normative tax base are the
most serious barriers to the development of business activity. For the
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entrepreneurs of Central and Eastern Europe, high taxes, corruption and
inflation are the main causes impeding business, while for ex-Soviet na-
tions, an untrustworthy judiciary system was mentioned by these authors.
The decisive factor in the new-enterprise formation in Eastern and West-
ern European countries as was shown by Webster (1992), Basareva
et al. (1995) has become the development of foreign trade, as well as
specific factors which may be described as an index of reforms or local
initiatives. Thus, Berkowitz and DeJong (1998) demonstrated on the RF
statistics that new-enterprise-formation in a region (number of firms per
resident) corresponds with the reform index which is defined by them as
progress in small scale privatization, in the degree of price control, and
in the level of subsidies to regional economies. They have found that the
initiative of local governments in privatization and the desire of regional
governments to get control of their capital stock displays a strong posi-
tive relationship with new-enterprise formation which, in turn, facilitates
economic growth in regions.
Very popular is the model of business climate developed by Mokry
(1988), Bartik (1989), attributing new enterprise formation to a combina-
tion of such factors as flexible employment policy, the low cost of pro-
duction factors, soft local taxation, support from governments. For an
explanation of this process in England, Keeble (1990) proposed three
theoretical models.
It is a model of economic depression increasing the number of potential
entrepreneurs, a model of per capita income growth underlying subse-
quent changes in market demand, and a model explaining the surge in
new enterprise formation by the emergence of radically new technolo-
gies (computerization). These theories were analyzed in the regional as-
pect by Amin and Storey (1986) in terms of the models called here the
Birmingham, Bologna and Boston models. In the Birmingham model,
new-enterprise formation is a direct result of regional and national in-
dustrial depression and corporate restructuring. In the Bologna model,
enterprise formation is explained by the higher demand in the techno-
logical market and specialization inside a geographic region where state
control stimulates enterprises not to expand in size. The Boston model is
an incubator model explaining the high rates of new enterprise formation
in the center of a large urban area with the highest cost of key factors of
production but with people seeking career opportunities and existence of
unstable sectors; access to production inputs, access to consumers,
presence of specialized production units, and access to R&D, informa-
tion and innovations.
Reynolds (1991) examined the attempts to analyze the enterprise effect
on the improvement of well-being in the USA and showed that changes
INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF NEW ENTERPRISE FORMATION IN RUSSIA18
in new and small firms had substantially influenced economic change in
the USA in the 1976–1984 period.
Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) made an empirical analysis of the
data for six nations of the OECD and demonstrated that increases in
employment in small enterprises depends to a large degree on industrial
restructuring of two types, i.e., decentralization of enterprises and new
small enterprise mergers, which are a response to higher consumer de-
mand for more diversified goods.
Different authors noted also other factors contributing to new-enterprise
formation: Bartik (1989), Moyes and Westhead (1990), Storey (1982) and
Webster (1992) indicated human capital; Glisin and Rogachevsky (1998),
Beesley and Hamilton (1984) — the level of various costs of setting up an
enterprise, including transaction costs; Storey (1982), Moyes, Westhead,
and Brusco (1982) — the presence of production factors and market infra-
structure; Brusco (1982) and Mason (1991) — access to studies and de-
velopments, information, innovations, new technologies; Bartik (1989),
Brusco (1982) — costs of social infrastructure; Zhuravskaya (1999), John-
son (1986), Mason (1991), Mokry (1988) — the presence or absence of
support from administration bodies; Johnson (1986), Mason (1991), Mokry
(1982) — social norms conducive to enterprise credibility.
A second group of authors investigated the phenomenon of small busi-
ness development focusing on its specific role in economic growth.
These researchers drew on Schumpeter's (1939) and Knight's (1921)
ideas elaborating theoretical concepts that mostly are not accompanied
by empirical tests. Knight (1921) in "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit" de-
scribed the entrepreneur as an individual with sound judgment that often
goes with self-confidence, as the "head" or one who is willing to take on
all risks and responsibilities for decisions made.
Baumol (1968), although he thought that the entrepreneur really disap-
peared from the literature in the 1950-s and 1960-s, suggested that
much of existing economic theory had relevance for entrepreneurship.
Studies should be focused on their application to the problem of maxi-
mizing the effect from the entrepreneur function. Baumol suggested for
the entrepreneur the role of "innovator according to Schumpeter." For
the case of an undeveloped economy, Baumol (1990) concludes that
studies should be concentrated on the impact of public policy on the
return to the risk-bearing function. Researchers should try to under-
stand, for example, the effect of alternative systems of taxation on en-
terprise development, or the effect of the structure of interest rates on
decisions to organize new firms. Public policies, the so-called rules of
the game, significantly influence whether entrepreneurship is allocated in
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productive or unproductive ways. Societies that are interested in im-
proving this allocation, in order to improve prosperity, ought to identify
and enact policies that reduce the marginal cost of risk-bearing. Taxes
on capital gain, for example, should be structured in such a way as to
resist arbitration and encourage long-term investments.
Ñoase (1937) answering the question about what determines optimal
firm size, writes: "the question is whether it is worthwhile to implement
an additional transaction within the framework of the present organiza-
tional structure. The marginal cost of organization of a process within a
firm should be equal to the cost of organization in any other firm or to
alternative cost in case of refusal from transaction in favor of instruments
of market price formation. Businessmen will always be experimenting in
higher or lower control of the process, thus maintaining the mechanism
that holds the equilibrium."
And, finally, a third branch of research has recently developed where
entrepreneurship is envisaged from the viewpoint of the theory of utility
and rational individual behavior in the labor market. Entrepreneurship is
identified with self-employment and is opposed to its alternative, that is
hired labor. For this group of research it is characteristic to use theo-
retical ideas of risk-aversion and to discern labor market segments.
Econometric equations of new enterprise growth assessed in these
studies are, as a rule, bound with an economic theory. This approach
permits us to avoid non-real models, making the model more plausible
and effective.
Berkowitz and Cooper (1997), Blanchard (1997) realized purely theoreti-
cal approach, Aslund (1997) carried out an empirical study.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) model low risk aversion and associate it
with individuals' entrepreneurial vision, at the same time taking into ac-
count the important function of the density of distribution of capital as-
sets among inhabitants.
Earle and Sakova (1999) proceed from the assumption that the probabil-
ity to choose self-employment is based on a certain surplus of utility
from self-employment over utility from being employed. Drawing on em-
pirical data of questionnaire surveys in six countries, including Russia,
they have proved that in Russia labor supply is a non-elastic function and
that, in comparison to other countries, the self-employment decision re-
quires a high premium.
The latter approach is fairly productive as it permits to bind econometric
equations of small enterprise growth with the economic theory. Dough-
erty (1997) thinks that building an econometric model on the basis of the
model of individual behavior has three possible merits. "First, this rela-
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tionship is valuable as such, second, it may help avoid specification of
non-real models, third, there is a probability that the theory will impose
constraints on specification and make it more plausible and effective."
Later we will show how the approach based on the model of rational be-
havior of an individual in the labor market can be elaborated and applied
to the analysis of regional disparities in enterprise formation in Russia.
4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework of this study required to explain the choice of
determinants and the interpretation of the obtained results is based on
Schumpeter's views (1939) that risk aversion is displayed only by part of
the population and on the tenets of the theory of utility and rational be-
havior in the labor market.
Taking into account the features of Russia's transition, we elaborate
Blanchflower and Oswald's model (1998). An attempt is made to pass
from the model of individual behavior to that of aggregate labor de-
mand-supply in a two-sector model of the economy. Unlike Blanch-
flower and Oswald's model (1998), each entrepreneur uses not only
his own labor but the labor of employees, and the self-employment
decision is taken on by him taking into account the risk of zero utility
from his activity.
The form of labor demand-supply functions in the two-sector economy
permits us to move to the estimation of relative demand-supply in the
self-employment market in an individual region similar to the approach of
Earle and Sakova (1999). The latter study is built on questionnaire survey
data and counts out the model rationale for demand-supply factors.
Consider the economy of a particular region consisting of two sectors.
The first sector — the traditional sector — will be called the wage sector.
The other sector is that of small enterprises. In contrast to Blanchflower
and Oswald (1998) and Earle and Sakova (1999), this sector includes not
only self-employed business owners, but also those employed in small
businesses.
N is the total employable population.
Every person from N can either work in the wage sector, or be an em-
ployee in a small enterprise, or set up a new enterprise himself. The em-
ployable population, therefore, is divided in the following way:
1 2 0N L L E L= + + + ,
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where 1L  is employment in the wage sector, 2L  is employment in small
enterprises, E are the individuals who made the self-employment deci-
sion and became entrepreneurs.
For simplicity, assume that one entrepreneur owns only one small enter-
prise, L0 are those unemployed, including voluntarily unemployed.
Shadow employment is not considered.
The decision of each individual i, i = 1, ..., N will be modeled on the ba-
sis of discrete choice, that is assuming that he chooses out of a number
of alternatives and decides on that which gives him maximum utility ui.
Assume that an individual maximizes his utility by setting up a small en-
terprise. Then he must have entrepreneurial vision and sufficient capital.
We can presume that if an individual has no entrepreneurial vision or
capital, his utility from a small enterprise is minus infinity.
Let β be a proportion of the employable population with entrepreneurial
flair. These people see opportunities where others do not.
There exist a multiplicity of potential projects for small enterprises, for
which different amounts of capital are required; this amount is k. The
capital is assumed to be randomly distributed among the population. The
relevant function of the density for those who possess entrepreneurial vi-
sion is ( )kϕ ; k lies between 0 and 1. For convenience, normalize the
richest person's capital assets at unity. The proportion of those with
capital less than k is ( )kΦ . That is
0
( ) ( )
k
k k dkΦ = ϕ∫ .
Since in the economy there is asymmetry of knowledge and the profit
from a project can be estimated only by a person with entrepreneurial
capacity, there is a low probability that a potential entrepreneur without
capital can get loan for his project. The probability of getting a loan is ρ.
It is natural to assume that among projects the first to be implemented
are those that require less expenditures of capital. The boundary capital
is *k , that is the amount required to implement a marginal project by a
marginal entrepreneur. Projects requiring greater capital are not imple-
mented. Knowing *k , we could estimate the number of entrepreneurs.
The probability that an individual will have capital sufficient to set up a
new enterprise is
*
1
*( ) 1 ( ).
k
k dk kϕ = − Φ∫
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To this probability the probability of obtaining a loan by people without
sufficient capital should be added:
*
*
0
( ) ( ).
k
k dk kρ ρϕ = Φ∫
The number of entrepreneurs E will be the sum of these two probabilities
multiplied by β and by the total employable population N :
( )
*
*
1
*
0
( ) ( ) 1 (1 ) ( )
k
k
E N k dk k dk N kβ ϕ ρ β ρ
  
= + ϕ = − − Φ   
∫ ∫
Let 2( , )k wπ  be the profit from a project requiring capital k , while wages
in the small business sector are w2, and in the wage sector, w1. Profit
includes, among other things, the entrepreneur's satisfaction from his
activity. It is normal to believe that π is a function increasing in k since
the first projects to be implemented are the more profitable ones, yield-
ing higher profits. Defining such a function we assume that if some en-
trepreneurs have already established small enterprises, the same op-
portunities are not narrowed to others.
Consider the decision made by a typical entrepreneur who has the pos-
sibility to set up a small enterprise. We assume that he makes his deci-
sion based on his function of utility, ( ).Eu π  He compares the expected
utility of the venture with the utility Eu  that he could get from another
activity. The expected utility is estimated taking into account probability
µ  that the newly created enterprise will go bankrupt and that the entre-
preneur will get zero income. The probability µ  is the determinant of the
small business risks. The level of utility Eu  can be also determined,
among other things, by the wage obtainable by the person as an em-
ployee either in the wage sector or in the small business sector. There-
fore, the minimum level of small enterprise profitability which makes
sense for a typical entrepreneur to create a new firm, *π , is determined
by the following equation:
*
1 2(1 ) ( ) (0) ( , ).E E Eu u u w wµ π µ− + =
This relation sets the boundary *π  as a function of the risks and income
from alternative activities:
* *
1 2( , , ).w wπ π µ=
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The condition of utility increase in profit from self-employment ( 0Eu′ > ),
and the condition of utility increase in wage rates (
1 2
0, 0Ew Ewu u′ ′> > )
determine the kind of relation of *π  on parameters:
*
0
π
µ
∂
>
∂
, 
*
1
0
w
π∂
>
∂
, 
*
2
0
w
π∂
>
∂
.
The relation for the boundary size of capital, *k , has the form:
* *
2 1 2( , ) ( , , ).k w w wπ π µ=
Hence
* *
1 2( , , )k k w wµ= .
The form of the function of labor demand of small enterprises is deter-
mined by the relationship of *k  to 1 2, ,w wµ .
2 2 2 2 1( , , , , , )
DL L w B wµ ρ β= .
The demand function also includes parameters ρ and β, determining the
number of small enterprises and exogenous factors 2B affecting small
enterprises.
On the other hand, consider the wage sector of the economy. For sim-
plicity, it will be modeled on the basis of the aggregate production func-
tion 1( )f L . Then the production function has the form:
1 1 1( )f L w L− .
Maximizing this function in 1L , we get the standard condition of the first
order:
1 1( )f L w′ = ,
which means that wages are equal to marginal labor productivity.
The function of marginal labor productivity is, therefore, the inverse
function of labor demand in the wage sector:
1 1 1( ) ( )
Df L w L′ = .
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Assuming the decreasing effect, the inverse demand function 1 1( )
Dw L  is
decreasing. Converting this function, we obtain the direct demand func-
tion 1 1( )
DL w .
Assuming the production function's dependence on some exogenous
factors 1B , i.e., 1 1( , )f f L B= , demand will also be a function of these fac-
tors, that is:
1 1 1 1( , )
DL L w B= .
The labor demand in our model draws on the model of discrete choice.
Individual i  makes a choice out of three utilities: the utility of working in
the wage sector 1 1( , )iu w A , the utility of working in a small enter-
prise 2 2( , )iu w A  and the utility of becoming involved in activity outside the
above sectors, including voluntary unemployment 0 0( , )iu w A . Variables
As, s = 0, 1, 2, include all additional factors affecting the individual's de-
cision. In this model we take them as exogenous, like 0w , too. The indi-
vidual chooses that type of employment from which he earns the great-
est utility. According to this, we can write the following functions of labor
demand in the two analyzed sectors :
1 1 1 2 1 2 0( , , , , )
SL L w w A A A=
and
2 2 1 2 1 2 0( , , , , )
SL L w w A A A= .
Both functions include the same factors.
5. SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL
AND TENTATIVE ESTIMATES
The econometric analysis will be focused on the following conclusions
drawn from the theoretical model.
• The level of enterprise formation in the economy is determined by
interconnected balances of supply-demand in the segments of the
labor market. Labor demand and labor supply in the small business
sector cannot be treated in isolation from the wage sector. The ratio
between earnings in the small enterprise sector and the wage sector
is a determinant in enterprise development.
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• Low risk aversion among a region's inhabitants accounts for regional
variation in small business formation in Russia. The higher is the per-
centage of people in a region who are able to embrace new ideas,
risk and liberal reformation, the higher labor demand appears in the
sector of small business.
• In creation of a favorable enterprise climate, asymmetry of knowledge
about the attractiveness of business-ideas and availability of dispos-
able resources in households is critical. Under higher transparency of
information, more small enterprises appear and labor demand is in-
creasing in the segment of small business.
• Regional risks make a significant component of entrepreneur climate.
Under high risks, the expected enterprise yield is reduced and labor
demand decreases.
Theoretical ideas about the connection between labor supply-demand
matching in the wage sector and the small business sector permit us to
come to an econometric estimation of equations of relative demand-
supply suggested by Earle and Sakova (1999). The price (earnings,
wage) and quantity of labor are measured in this statement in relative
units and the relation of demand to supply is as follows:
D = D(w, X)
S = S(w, Z),
where D is the aggregate labor demand in the small business sector re-
lated to that in the wage sector, S is the aggregate labor supply in the
small business sector related to that in the wage sector, w is the ratio of
average earnings in the small business sector to that in the wage sector,
X is a vector influencing the relative change in demand, Z is a vector in-
fluencing the relative change in supply. Such a statement permits us to
predict the signs of the independent variables in the regression equa-
tions.
The function of relative demand is defined as a function reverse to that
of relative opportunities in the small business sector over the wage sec-
tor, so that δD/δw < 0.
The function of relative supply reflects the degree of mobility of the
labor force factor between the small business and wage sector, so that
δS/δw > 0. The effect of shifts along X and Z in the equilibrium of relative
volumes and prices can be easily presented. The total differential in the
equilibrium state D = S equals
(δD/δw)dw + (δD/δX)dX = (δS/δw)dw + (δS/δZ)dZ.
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If dZ = 0, then dw/dX > 0, and if dX = 0, then dw/dZ < 0. Eliminating dw,
it is easy to show that dQ/dX > 0 and dQ/dZ > 0 (Q is the equilibrium
point). This permits us to state a simple result: relative remuneration in
the small business sector will be higher when demand factors dominate,
and lower or even negative when shifts of the supply curve are more
substantial.
The components of vectors X, Z are determined by the model presented
in Section 4.
The basic determinants of relative labor demand in the aggregated seg-
ment of small businesses are the following: the relative earnings of those
employed in small businesses to those employed in the wage sector,
risks, presence in the region's economy of capital which potentially can
be invested in small business, the percentage of inhabitants in the region
with entrepreneurial flair. Regional policy and crimes are taken as factors
of risk in new enterprise formation.
The basic determinants of labor supply in the aggregate segment of
small businesses are relative earnings and factors skewing the supply
curve.
The report presents the model and calculations for the initial period of
the small enterprise sector in 1990–1992.
The structure of the model of relative demand-supply of the aggregate
segment of small businesses for the economy consisting of i regions
is a system of simultaneous equations (Simultaneous Equations Models)
and is
0 1 2
0 1 2
,
,
.
D D
S S
D S
Demand equation
Supply equation
Equilibrium condition
q p y
q p z
q q Q
α α α ε
β β β ε
= + + +
= + + +
= =
We will estimate the system where the supply equation is written with re-
gard to price:
1 2
3 4
5
(Re )
( ) 1990 1991 ,
it it it it
it it it
it it i it
Sharesm b Wsmwgov b Crime
b gElit BudGRm b ExpRisk
b PolElect DepBal dummy dummy
α
γ ε
= − − +
+ − +
+ + + + + (1)
1 2
3 1990 1991 ,
it it it it
it i it
Wsmwgov c Sharesm c Workpop
c SumGrad dummy dummy u
β
ν
= + − −
− + + + + (2)
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where:
Sharesmit is relative labor demand or supply in the small business sector
in relation to the wage sector in region i in year t; it is measured by the
percentage of small business employment in relation to all other em-
ployment;
Wsmgovit is the relative earnings of a small enterprise employee in region
i in year t;
Crimeit is crime;
RegElitit BudGRmit is regional policy in region i in year t;
ExpRisk is an estimate of the investment risk in region i in year t;
ÐîlElect DepBalit is enterprise potential of region i in year t;
Workpopit is the percentage of the employable population of region i in
year t;
SumGradit is the percentage of graduates of all learning institutions to
the total inhabitants of region i in year t;
Dummy 1990, 1991 — dummy of the respective year;
γi, νi — fixed effect of spatial organization;
ε it, uit is a symbol of error.
Data on earnings in the small business sector and data on small business
employment in 1990–1992 were estimated from the RF Goskomstat infor-
mation handbooks that can be described as relic. They were published by
the Goskomstat at the beginning of perestroika for federal civil servants in
no more than 100 copies; some had a stamp "For internal use only." The
author has great trust in these data since in 1990–1992 the number of
enterprises was small, and the information was compiled on the basis of a
complete and not sampling survey as in subsequent years. Also, at the
beginning of perestroika, tax dodging and, therefore, concealment of real
wages had not reached the level witnessed at present.2
                                               
2 In the phone interview Olga Sinitsina, Head of the Goskomstat Non-state Sector
Department of Finance and Development, who has information on wages in small
businesses, expressed great doubt over the credibility of the data for 1995–1999.
These data comply with bookkeeping reporting but not with real wages. Official
Goskomstat data on wage size in the small enterprise sector in 1995–1999 are
much below the regional average. For example, in 1995 in some regions
the wages in small businesses were just 0.09 to those in the wage sector, which
averages 0.55. Surveys of workers show that actual pay received in the small
business sector can be 25-fold the calculated wage. For the most part, wages
were paid, as a rule, in "black cash," which made it possible to avoid taxation.
Yearly losses of the federal budget as a result of hidden real wages in the small
enterprise sector alone were, by the author’s estimate, a minimum of 1.5–3%. In
1990–1992, relative wages in small businesses were to the wage sector averaged
1.16, and were a maximum of 2.69.
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The task of searching for variables measuring enterprise potential of a
region and enterprise risks both in the general case and with reference
to the Russian situation seems rather difficult. We assumed that a good
indicator of low risk aversion can be the stability of the political prefer-
ences of the inhabitants.
In present-day Russia, entrepreneurship is a new kind of activity. It is
undertaken mostly by those inhabitants who have the inclination towards
and receptivity to social innovations and, in a broader sense, to eco-
nomic and political reforms. The results of election campaigns in Russia
rather consistently demonstrate the political preference of the electorate,
which can imply that behind these results steady factors of the territorial
differentiation of society in the propensity to risk-bearing exist. Variable
PolElect — stability of the political preference of inhabitants estimated
through processing the election data that was taken from a database
prepared by the order of the Russian Unions of Industrialists and Entre-
preneurs. The higher PolElect variable, the more consistent and liberally
oriented preferences, are demonstrated by the region's inhabitants and
the higher proportion of them who have low risk aversion.
The theory assumes that an effect on enterprise formation is made by
the share of inhabitants with low risk aversion and presumably necessary
capital. The effect of PolElect variable in our model is increasing (de-
creasing) according to the presence of capital needed to start up one's
own business. For appraisal of this capital, we used the indicators of bal-
ance on deposits in savings banks. We were guided by information ob-
tained from questionnaire data of the surveys of entrepreneurs which
show that starting capital for opening one's own business in Russia was,
as a rule, borrowed from near relatives, acquaintances or was the prop-
erty of the entrepreneur. Bank loans practically were not used because
of high interest rates. Before price liberalization, the inhabitants in Rus-
sian regions preferred to keep their money in savings banks. Therefore,
the entrepreneur potential of the region — variable ÐîlElect DepBalit–1 —
is determined in our model by the combined effect or product of two
variables — PolElect — assessment of propensity to risk and DepBalit–1
— demand balances in saving banks in year t – 1.
Variable ÐîlElect DepBalit–1 corresponds to our conceptual model where
enterprise formation depends on the availability of required capital
among individuals with low risk aversion.
RegElitit BudGRmit is a measure of regional policy in region i in year t.
The product of two variables is RegElitit BudGRmit; BudGRmit is an
indicator of the economic potential of institutions in region i in year t.
It is measured as a ratio of expenditures of regional budgets to GRP
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in region i in year t. It is used in measures relative to the national
average.
This indicator was suggested by Kolodko (2000) and Popov (2000),
who noted that the dynamics of state expenditures in the period of
transition turns out to be a factor important for successful transfor-
mation. A sharp cutback in state expenditures is a straight way to the
collapse of institutions and to a deep fall in output accompanied by
increased social inequality. This observation concerns not only the
national but also the regional level as well. For estimation of the indi-
cator of economic potential of regional institutions, data on GRP ob-
tained by Mikheeva (1999) were used. (Official data began to be pub-
lished in 1994). Data on the expenditures of regional budgets in
1990–1992 are taken from working documents of the RF Ministry of
Finance.3
For regions in Russia at the beginning of perestroika, not only was the
relative size of the economic potential of institutions very important
but also the political orientation of those who disposed of these re-
sources. As an indicator we used a combined effect of variables
RegElitit and BudGRmit Variable RegElitit — the measure of influence
of the regional elite and the attitudes of authorities toward reform —
is taken from the database prepared on the request of the Russian
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The higher is this measure,
the more influential and more liberal are the regional elite.
The statement "elite as a variable" is central among the reasons for
the regime's downfall is a keystone in transition studies (Rustow,
1970). It is argued that the role of the elite in nations in transition is
multiplied many times since the process itself necessarily destroys
the consensus within the old elite, creates a cleavage between old
and new elite in the field of ideology, demanding negotiations be-
tween the old elite and new public forces. The establishment of de-
mocracy requires that there is a moral cohesion within the elite (Higey
and Burton, 1989).
The combined effect of the variables RegElitit and BudGRmit shows
the presumed strategy of economic reformation. The higher this
measure, the higher is the size of resources under the jurisdiction of
                                               
3 This information was meticulously hidden over a number of years in the begin-
ning of perestroika for fear of a possible undesirable initiative of "parade of sov-
ereignties" and did not appear in the open press. These data were given to author
as to an expert of the Committee of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and have
survived only by chance.
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liberally oriented government officials in the region and, therefore, the
more probable it is that economic transformations in the region will
go in the democratic direction, business risks will go down, and the
credibility of business rules among entrepreneurs will be enhance.
This measure is one of those determining political risks.
Crimeit is measure of crime in the region. It is inserted into the model
as a measure of increasing risk. Presumably, the more crime in the
region, the more dangerous the environment, the lower enterprise
formation, and the lower demand for labor.
ExpRiskit is an index of investment risk. It measures the kind of envi-
ronment for an investor, that is the probability of loss of investments
and of yield. It is the average weighted sum of private risks. The data
are taken from "Expert" journal.
The theoretical model of Section 4 determines the specification of the
equation of relative labor supply. Two hypotheses are tested. One is
that at higher relative utility, the overflow from the wage sector to the
new sector was increasing — relative labor supply is increasing under
a higher level of utility. The second is that labor supply depends on
the state of the local labor market of the region — on the number of
employable inhabitants and graduates from all kinds of educational
institutions. To measure these indicators, the RF Goskomstat data
were used. The indicators are standardized to the number of the re-
gion's inhabitants.
In preliminary estimations the effect of a region's educational poten-
tial (percentage of specialists with higher occupational education
among the employed) and sex-specific structure of the inhabitants
(percentage of men among the region's employable inhabitants) was
tested. The significance of these factors was not supported by the
estimations. Besides that, as a measure of the relationship (in work
earnings) between new and enduring sectors of enterprises variable
lnWsmgovit was introduced. No appreciable improvement in the sta-
tistical characteristics of the model was obtained.
In the course of measuring the parameters of the system of simulta-
neous equations, it is necessary to distinguish between endogenous
and exogenous variables. A variable is endogenous if its value is de-
termined within the model. A variable is exogenous if its value is de-
termined outside the model and, therefore, is taken as preset. The
classification is important since the methods of measuring presup-
pose that in each equation exogenous variables are not correlated
with error. Endogenous variables, as a rule, have non-zero correla-
tion. Two variables are endogenous in the model: Sharesmit — the
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share of small enterprise employment in year t over the employment
in the wage sector and Wsmwgovit — relative earnings of employment
in small enterprises.
The other regressors are exogenous variables. They are determined
outside the model: RegElitit — the measure of influence of the re-
gional elite, Crimeit — crime, PolElectit — propensity to risk-taking,
Workpopit — percent of employable population in the region's econ-
omy, SumGradit — the relationship of the number of graduates of all
types of learning institutions in the region to the number of the re-
gion's inhabitants.
ExpRiskit — an index of investment risk. It is possible to suppose that
DepBalit–1 — demand deposits in saving banks — is contingent on
wages, but we use a lagged variable of the previous year.
The measure of the economic power of institutions in the region
BudGRmit is estimated on the data on expenditures of regional budg-
ets. Methods for estimation of regional budgets in the 1990–1992
period was based on annual changes in the structure of regulating in-
come sources. The structure of "splitting" the federal taxes and de-
termining the share that will be assigned to the regional budget were
determined by the Center for each region separately. The size of the
region's budget, therefore, characterized the region/federal relation-
ship and is therefore an exogenous variable.
There is also other evidence of the exogenous quality of the chosen
variables given by Earle and Sakova (1999). Pondering whether the
choice of a particular kind of education is endogenous or exogenous
variable, they note that while for a market economy this variable is
endogenous (this choice can be done with self-employment inten-
tion), and in the case of transition economies of the early 1990-s, the
choice of particular education is an exogenous variable. When this
choice is being made, the individual can not foresee the possibility of
self-employment. In socialist nations no such alternative existed at
that time. It is suggested that such variables are called quasi-
experimental. They break apart some relationships or groups of vari-
ables which under other conditions would be defined as endogenous.
Our variables relate to the 1990–1992 period. Before that time actu-
ally there were no small businesses, which makes an additional argu-
ment to recognize the exogenous quality of the regressors.
Turning back to the system of equations, note that both equations
describing the relative demand-supply in the aggregate segment
of small businesses are overidentifiable. The order condition holds
with ">" sign.
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6. METHODS AND RESULTS OF ESTIMATIONS
The estimation of the model was done in two ways: by 2SLS (two-stage
least squares), which is a partial case of methods IV (instrumental vari-
able estimators) and FIML (full-information maximum likelihood) (Green,
1997, chapter 16). While the former method estimates each equation
separately, the latter estimates all equations and parameters together.
Estimation by the OLS method is given as an illustration to show that the
estimates are skewed and not robust.
The results of the estimations are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2. Model of relative labor demand in small businesses (base variant for
1990–1992).
2SLS FIML OLS
Constant 5.05**
[3.608]
5.83**
[2.979]
–1.1219
[–1.086]
Wsmwgov –0.865**
[–8.339]
–0.949*
[–6.393]
–0.300**
[–6.092]
PolElect DepBal 0.0009*
[2.312]
0.0009**
[3.023]
0.0015**
[7.115]
Ñrime 0.0017**
[8.770]
0.0016**
[5.472]
0.0018**
[8.476]
RegElit BudGRm 0.1283*
[1.708]
0.110
[1.032]
0.137**
[1.717]
Exprisk 0.993*
[2.312]
1.182*
[1.815]
1.360**
[3.001]
Dummy 1990 8.1252**
[10.749]
8.617**
[7.528]
4.540**
[9.182]
Dummy 1991 2.15*
[6.771]
2.246**
[4.703]
1.230**
[4.112]
Number
of observations 212 212 212
R2 adj. 34.7% 34% 37%
F-statistics F(7.204) = 34.74
Prob > F = [0.0000]
F(7.204) = 16.46
Prob > F = [0.0000]
F(7.204) = 27.28
Prob > F = 0.0000
Wsmwgov — Relative earnings in small business sector;
PolElect DepBal — Region's enterprise potential;
RegElit BudGRm — Regional policy;
Exprisk — Regional risks;
T-statistics are in brackets;
* — 5% level of significance;
** — 1% level of significance.
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Table 3. Model of relative earnings from employment in the small business sector
(basic variant of 1990–1992).
2SLS FIML OLS
Constant 39.432**
[6.551]
38.912**
[5.292]
25.287**
[6.881]
Sharesm 0.357*
[1.781]
0.377*
[1.463]
–0.1849*
[2.134]
Workpop –0.563**
[–4.931]
– 0.536**
[–3.783]
–0.285**
[–4.349]
SumGrad –0.208*
[2.282]
–0.288**
[–2.891]
–0.077
[0.980]
Dummy 1990 8.032**
[22.627]
8.072**
[19.367]
7.753**
[22.944]
Dummy 1991 2.307**
[6.662]
2.230**
[5.648]
2.155**
[6.479]
Number
of observations 212 212 212
R2 adj. 74% 70% 75%
F-statistics F(5.206) = 101.83
Prob > F = 0.0000
F(5.206) = 91.86
Prob > F = 0.0000
F(5.206) = 101.85
Prob > F = 0.0000
Sharesm — Proportion of small business employment;
Workpop — Employable population;
SumGrad — Graduates from higher learning institutions;
T-statistics are in brackets;
* — 5% level of significance;
** — 1% level of significance.
Obtained is a model with the expected signs of the relationship of rela-
tive labor demand to relative earnings ("–") and relative labor supply to
relative earnings ("+"). Both are significant in their equations.
In the demand equation relative earnings is significant at the 1% level.
The coefficients obtained by the 2SLS and FIML methods have similar
values. With increasing relative earnings by unity, relative labor demand
decreased 0.86 (elasticity of labor to earnings). The analysis was made
on the results of the 2SLS estimation.
Risks are considered in the model through their effect on demand by
three measures: the level of crime, the index of investment risk ExpRisk
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and the institutional variable RegElit BudGRm. The variable Crime was
significant in the equation, but the sign of the variable does not fit the
prediction. It was supposed that crime checks small business growth.
But as was shown by the estimations, crime promotes business. There is
evidence confirming that such a regularity can take place. Brown and
Earle (2000), who applied the share of regional economy controlled by
criminal groups as an indicator of crime, drew the conclusion that crimi-
nal groups might facilitate the supply of goods due, for example, to by-
passing bureaucratic barriers or to protecting deliveries from plunder,
thus helping to improve the efficiency of enterprises.
Regressor ExpRisk entered the equation with a sign opposite to that ex-
pected. The higher is the risk for an investor, the higher is the labor de-
mand in the small enterprise sector. There can be more than one expla-
nation for this. The index of investment risk has been estimated by the
Russian rating agency "Export-PA" for large investors, mostly foreign.
This summary measure consists of estimations of legislative, political,
economic, financial, social, criminal and economic risks. The weights of
the components of the summary measures of investment risk were ob-
tained through a survey of experts. It is not ruled out that the measure,
derived in this way, is far from reality. On the other hand, it is possible
that when regions with high investment risk are avoided by respectable
international investors, an environment with low competition arises with a
niche left for small investors running businesses in their native places. It
is also possible that initial enterprise formation in Russia has given birth
to initiatives taken earlier by unskilled people. Creating their small enter-
prises, they did not think much about real risks. This is also in line with
the positive coefficient of Crime.
The hypothesis that liberal authorities, with control over their capital
stock, are successful in attracting new enterprise was confirmed. The
coefficient of the variable RegElit BudGRm is "plus," but in the FIML es-
timation it is insignificant. The 2SLS method produced a model with a
significant positive coefficient at the 0.5% level. The elasticity of labor
demand under the institutional variable is 0.12. Important evidence was
obtained indicating that for regional economic growth, not only is the
amount of state expenditures critical which was repeatedly noted by
analysts, for example, by Sonin (2000), but also critical is the political
orientation of policy-makers who control and manage these resources. In
fact we obtained an estimation of the influence and role of policy mak-
ers' political orientation on the course of economic reform.
Federal legislation has empowered local governments to interfere in the
activity of private enterprises as they like. Mechanisms of such interfer-
ence are well known: the support of "right" enterprises by giving them
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tax exemptions and soft credits, bias in authorization of economic activity
which permits such enterprises to get monopolistic profit, and bribing of
local governments. The present wide spread range of prices within Rus-
sian borders is mostly explained by the fact that local government can
use judiciary processes to hinder some kinds of trade and check com-
petition. Inspections performed by different regional agencies concern-
ing all aspects of enterprises activity are an impediment to all entrepre-
neurs.
Channels of pressure do exist, and how local officials make use of them
depends on concrete personalities, the situation in the region and the
size of the resources that are at the disposal of the officials. The hy-
pothesis that a well-knit and liberally disposed elite assists reforms, en-
trepreneur activity and, ultimately, the flow of labor resources from the
wage sector to the new enterprise sector received statistical substantia-
tion. It is possible to presume that this influence takes place due to the
higher credibility of entrepreneurs and to the reduction of their transac-
tion costs associated with insurance against risks in case of possible
resignation of regional officials.
The absence of conflicts between power branches would cut transac-
tion costs borne by entrepreneurs, otherwise local clashes provoke
extortions and expenditures must be guarded against unexpected
blows from the camp of enemies. Locally, entrepreneurs are divided, as
a rule, into enterprise networks lobbying for access to the network of
members of regional or local governments. Entrepreneurs set up asso-
ciations, unions, amalgamations, etc. At present, in the period of gov-
ernor election campaigns and existing opposition between mayors of
regional capitals and serving governors, shadowy networks become
visible. In the case that authorities are replaced, the established chan-
nels are broken and efforts to create new ones are required. That is
why entrepreneurs have begun to seek ways to enter the governments
themselves. This would spare them these expenditures. At the ground
level, in fact, a transition has taken place to a political order known
from pre-revolutionary Russia as vote qualification. In those times and
in some provinces, there was an open law according to which the right
to vote was given only to those people owning some property. At pres-
ent this law is obscured, making a kind of institutional trap for an
emerging democracy.
The theoretical assumption about a favorable impact made on enterprise
formation by the joint effect of low risk aversion and the amount of capi-
tal in the population has been corroborated. Measure ÐîlElect DepBalit
entered the equation with a "plus" sign in all three estimations. The
measure is significant (2SLS — 5%, FILM — 1%).
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In order to include the effect of the specifics of the year on the random
term in regression, annual dummies were included in the demand equa-
tion. The significance of these variables is at the 1%-level, which indi-
cates a difference between the processes in 1990 and 1991. This follows
also from Section 2 analyzing interregional entrepreneur time-series on
small enterprise formation per 1000 population. In 1990 the year effect
wase up 8.12 additional units of relative labor demand, and in 1991, 2.15
units. The demand intensity, therefore, went down in 1992.
Equation of relative labor supply (Table 3.) supports the hypothesis
that under higher relative earnings, the overflow from the wage sector to
the new sector increases — relative labor supply is increasing with in-
creased earnings. In the earning equation, the factor of relative employ-
ment in the small business segment entered with the expected sign
("+") and is significant at the 5% level in two variants estimated by the
2SLS and FIML methods.
Theoretical propositions about the effect of the proportion of employable
population in the total population on the amount of relative supply are
supported. The variable entered the regression with the expected sign,
and it is significant. The variable "proportion of graduates" needs special
attention. Its significant effect can be explained by the fact that educated
young people are willing to choose new enterprises for their career. In-
vestment in education promotes new enterprise formation and economic
growth.
In order to reflect the specific effect of the conditions of a year on the
random term in regression, annual dummies were included in the supply
equation. The significance of these variables is at the 1% level, which
suggests a difference between the processes in 1990 and 1991. In 1990
the annual effect was 8.03 extra units of relative earnings, while in 1991,
it was 2.3 units.
The influence of non-identified fixed regional distinctions are reflected in
the model by inserting dummies for different territories (see Table 4–7).
Two types of dummy were used. The first type was for individual subjects
of the federation, which in the analysis of interregional differentiation in
Section 2 manifested some deviations from the general trends. The sec-
ond type of dummy was determined by the economic district to which
the subject of the federation belongs. Dummies were included both in
the demand and supply equations. The model was estimated by a two-
stage least squares. Dummies were inserted for the following subjects:
city of St. Petersburg, city of Moscow, the Tiumen province (Oblast), the
Magadan province(Oblast). The use of these dummies did not lead to
qualitative changes in the estimation. Only the dummies for the Magadan
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province were significant for the demand equation (positive sign of the
coefficient, 5% level of significance).
Table 4. Model of relative labor demand in small businesses with Magadan prov-
ince dummy.
Coefficient t-statistics
Constant 5.294751** 3.830
Wsmwgov –0.8320698** –8.464
PolElect DepBal 0.0008414** 3.581
Ñrime 0.0017409** 8.515
RegElit BudGRm 0.0904893 1.173
Exprisk 0.7542927** 1.689
Dummy 1990 7.768986** 10.674
Dummy 1991 2.039834** 6.525
Dummy Magadan 1.849404* 1.914
Number of observations 212
R2 adj. 0.5366
F-statistics F(8, 203) = 31.55
Prob > F = 0.0000
Wsmwgov — Relative earnings in small business sector;
PolElect DepBal — Region's entrepreneurial potential;
RegElit BudGRm — Regional policy;
Exprisk — Regional risks;
* — 5% level of significance;
** — 1% level of significance.
For the earnings equation, the Tiumen province dummy had a significant
influence (negative coefficient, 5% significance). The specifics of these
regions are different. For the Magadan province, the dummy reflects its
geographical location: the presence of a sea port, borders, opportunities
for foreign economic activity. For the Tiumen province, the geographic
specifics are its oil producing arctic region.
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Table 5. Model of relative earnings from employment in the small business sector
with Tiumen province dummy.
Coefficient t-statistics
Constant  38.25437** 6.591
Sharesm 0.3392688* 1.742
Workpop –0.5384367** –4.908
SumGrad –0.2205492* –2.399
Dummy 1990 8.020926** 22.718
Dummy 1991 2.302182** 6.672
Dummy Tiumen –2.446488* –1.947
Number of observations 212
R2 adj. 0.7429
F-statistics F(6, 205) = 88.11
Prob > F = 0.0000
Sharesm — Proportion of small business employment;
Workpop — Region's employable population;
SumGrad — Graduate from higher learning institutions;
* — 5% level of significance;
** — 1% level of significance.
The use of dummies by which the federal unit is related to a particular
economic district has shown that, as in the first case, there are eco-
nomic district with specifics in demand  and those with specifics in sup-
ply. The demand model significantly included the Volga district, North-
Caucasus, and the Ural district (positive sign). Keen demand in these re-
gions is likely to be associated with entrepreneurial activity of the in-
habitants.
The utility model significantly includes North-Western, Central, Northern
Caucasus, and West-Siberian districts (negative sign) which provides
evidence of additional labor supply in these economic regions.
Inclusion of dummies in the equations of regression did not lead to any
quality changes in the estimations.
The obtained statistical estimations were tested for robustness for inclu-
sion in equations of the so-called initial condition variables, reflecting the
level of concentration of industry. The following variables were used:
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value of fixed capital per individual employed in industry and number of
employees in one enterprise. But the significance of these variables in
the equations was not confirmed in the estimations.
Table 6. Model of relative labor demand in small businesses with economic dis-
tricts dummy.
Coefficient t-statistics
Constant 4.208169** 3.603
Wsmwgov –0.8961494** –11.164
PolElect DepBal 0.0010385** 5.121
Ñrime 0.0021089** 10.773
RegElit BudGRm 0.1369517* 2.069
Exprisk 0.9154015* 2.302
Dummy 1990 8.654563** 14.280
Dummy 1991 2.303986** 8.491
Dummy North-Caucasus 0.9728534* 2.551
Dummy Ural district 0.722044* 2.319
Dummy Volga district 1.246388** 1.246388
Number of observations 212
R2 adj. 0.6348
F-statistics F(10, 201) = 37.67
Prob > F = 0.0000
Wsmwgov — Relative utility in small business sector;
PolElect DepBal — Entrepreneurial potential of the region;
RegElit BudGRm — Regional policy;
Exprisk — Regional risks;
* — 5% level of significance;
** — 1% level of significance.
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Table 7. Model of relative earnings from employment in the small business sector
with economic districts dummy.
Coefficient t-statistics
Constant 44.35371** 6.997
Sharesm 0.3684712 1.952
Workpop –0.6500072** –5.460
SumGrad –0.1776277* –2.029
Dummy 1990 8.020508** 23.426
Dummy 1991 2.265843** 6.773
Dummy North-West –2.021219 –2.685
Dummy Central –1.349458 –3.250
Dummy Northern Caucasus –2.589782** –3.610
Dummy West-Siberian –1.133759 –2.158
Number of observations 212
R2 adj. 0.7578
F-statistics F(9, 202) = 67.02
Prob > F = 0.0000
Sharesm — Proportion of small business employment;
Workpop — Region's employable population;
SumGrad — Graduates of higher learning institutions;
* — 5% level of significance;
** — 1% level of significance.
The estimation methods used in this study can result in biased inconsis-
tent estimates if some of the explanation variables are actually endoge-
nous and thus are changing due to the same cause that affects the re-
sult under consideration. For example, in estimating the impact of
education on incomes, it is possible to assume that education is actually
an endogenous factor. Griliches (1977) statement that there exists some
non-observable factor — aptitudes of the individual that correlate both
with income (higher aptitudes — higher incomes) and with education
(higher aptitudes — higher education) is quite plausible.
Formally such a situation appears in using the instrumental variable
method when there is a weak correlation between instruments and en-
dogenous explanation variables. This problem has been thoroughly ana-
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lyzed by John Bound, David Jaeger, and Regina Baker (1995). The
authors' advice is to select instruments drawing on the results of the es-
timation of the first step. In conclusion they write: "More generally, our
results suggest that the partial R2 and F statistic on the excluded instru-
ments in the 2SLS first-stage regression are useful as rough guides to
the quality of IV estimates. We suggest that both statistics be routinely
reported when IV estimates are presented."
The test has shown that in our case, when using the 2SLS estimation
method, this situation does not occur. Here are the statistics of the first
step in the estimation of the demand-supply system of equations by the
2SLS method. This evidence relates to Tables 2 through 7.
Table 8. Estimation of the instrument to endogenous variable relationships when
using 2SLS.
R2 F-statistics
Table 2 57% F(8.203) = 29.44, Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 3 75% F(8.203) = 68.83, Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 4 58% F (10.201) = 25.31, Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 5 75.9% F(10.201) = 57.38, Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 6 67% F(14.197) = 26.89, Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 7 77% F(14.197) = 44.85, Prob > F = 0.0000
The test has shown that in our 2SLS estimate of the first step, the rela-
tionship between endogenous explanation variables and the instruments
cannot be recognized as weak.
7. CONCLUSION
One of the decisive problems of an economy in transition is the devel-
opment of the new sector of entrepreneurship. This study shows the
asymmetric character of entrepreneurship in the regions of Russia. The
correlation of this trend with regional per capita income asymmetry indi-
cates poor regional management of these processes on the part of fed-
eral and regional authorities in the 1990–1999 period.
In the Golden Age of entrepreneurship of 1990–1992, variation in enter-
prise formation was accounted for by different entrepreneurial initiatives
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of the inhabitants and the different institutional environment supporting
entrepreneurship. In this period a great number of unskilled lay people
were involved in this process, and business formation was going on un-
der conditions of high risk. Self- and small enterprise employment cre-
ated advantages in income over the wages in the wage sector and thus
compensated for the risks. It is argued in this study that institutional dis-
parities arising in response to reforms on the part of inhabitants and
local authorities impede enterprise formation. Decentralization of budg-
etary revenues promotes entrepreneurship if the regional elite is suffi-
ciently liberal and consolidated. Taking into account specific Russian fis-
cal federalism, federal/regional relations need to be settled.
The results of the study essentially supplement the conclusions made by
Earle and Sakova (1999). Although the data of this study refer to 1993,
are based on questionnaire surveys of entrepreneurs, use different
methods for estimation, and interpretation of the obtained results is
based on a comparison with other post-socialist countries; the findings
of both studies conform. While Earle and Sakova (1999) show that in
Russia the expected share of entry to self-employment is lower and the
premium higher and that this is due to the many barriers to entry faced
by new businessmen in Russia, our study shows the mechanisms of
these barriers.
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APPENDICES
A1. Data
The data panel is formed from the data from the RF Goskomstat, data
of "Expert" journal assessing investment climate in the region, data
from the survey "Entrepreneurial Climate of Russia's Regions, Geog-
raphy of Russia for Investors and Entrepreneurs" made on order of
the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and data ob-
tained by Mikheeva (1999). For testing some hypotheses, the results
of the questionnaire survey of entrepreneurs made by the author in
October 1999 were used. Here are the variables used in the estima-
tions for 1990–1992.
Sharesmit is the proportion of small enterprise employment in year t
compared to wage sector employment. Small enterprise employment for
1990 is the number of employed in co-operatives. The data is from "Ba-
sic Indicators of the Activity of Cooperatives in the RSFSR for 1990," and
The statistical book of the RF Goskomstat. For 1991 and 1992, the num-
ber is estimated as the sum of those employed in cooperatives and small
enterprises, obtained from "Basic Indicators of the Activity of Coopera-
tives and Small Enterprises in the Russian Federation for 1991"; RF Go-
skomstat, 1992; "Basic Indicators of the Activity of Cooperatives in the
RSFSR for 1992"; and the RF Goskomstat, 1993.
Wsmwgovit — relative earnings — relationship of wages fund of a worker
in the new enterprise sector (co-operatives, small firms) to average
monthly wage of the rest of the employed in region i in year t. Data on
wages in the small enterprise sector are used. Data on wages in the
small business sector were taken from "Basic Indicators of the Activity of
Cooperatives in the RSFSR for 1990." The statistical volumes of the
RSFSR Goskomstat entitled "Basic Indicators of the Activity of Coopera-
tives and Small Enterprises in the Russian Federation for 1991"; RF Go-
skomstat, 1992; and "Basic Indicators of the Activity of Cooperatives and
Small Enterprises in the Russian Federation for 1992," RF Goskomstat,
1993 were also used. Data on average monthly wages are taken from
the handbook "Regions of Russia," Goskomstat, 1998. Data are in cur-
rent prices.
DepBalit–1 are balances on deposits in RF saving banks per capita in
year t – 1 in region i. The variable is deflated to the consumer price in-
dex. In estimations, a lagged quantity was used.
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BudGRmit is an indicator of the economic power of institutions in region
i in year t. It is measured as the relation of regional budgets to GRP in
region i in year t to the national average. Official data for calculating
this indicator for 1990–1992 are absent. Data on regional budgets for
1990–1992 are taken from working documents of the RSFSR Ministry of
Finance. The estimation of gross regional production for 1990–1992 ob-
tained by Mikheeva (1999) by World Bank procedures was used.
RegElitit is the influence of the regional elite. It is based on expert
measures of executive and legislative authorities and of the stability of
the regional elite used in relative measures as deviation from the national
average. The higher the measure, the more influential is the regional
elite and the more reformist are the authorities. The source of this
measure is "Entrepreneur Climate of Russia's Regions. Geography of
Russia for Investors and Entrepreneurs."
PolElectit is an index of electorate voting patterns. It is based on the
voting results of the 1995 Duma and 1996 presidential elections. Ac-
cording to the share of votes given to a particular block or candidate,
regions are divided into reformist (rank 4), moderately reformist (3),
moderately conservative (2), conservative (1). It is the arithmetic mean of
these ranks plus the rank of the stability of political preferences (the
higher it is, the better for entrepreneurship). The result is divided by the
mean for federation subjects. The higher the value, the more stable and
democratic are the preferences of the region's inhabitants. This indicator
can be interpreted also as pre-transition institutional conditions.
The data source is "Entrepreneur Climate of Russia's Regions. Geogra-
phy of Russia for Investors and Entrepreneurs."
ExpRiskit is an investment risk indicator. It is an indicator of investors'
business conditions. It characterizes the probability of loss or income
from investments. It is estimated as the expert average weighted values
of partial ratings of the political, social, economic, environmental and
criminal situation in a region. Value 1 in special risk was obtained by a
region with the lowest risk. In estimating the integral value of the risk in-
dex, the weight estimation was obtained from the result of a survey of
Russian and foreign experts. The average weighted index for Russia is
unity. The data are from "PA-Expert."
Crimeit is a measure of crime in the region. It is inserted into the model
as a measure of increasing risk. Presumably, the more crime in the re-
gion, the more dangerous is the environment, the lower is enterprise
formation, and the lower is the demand for labor.
Workpopit is the proportion of employable inhabitants in region i in
year t. The RF Goskomstat data was used.
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SumGradit is the total number of graduates from all learning institutions
of region i in year t. The indicator is normalized at the number of inhabi-
tants. The source is the RF Goskomstat data.
A2. The relation of those employed in cooperatives
and small enterprises to those employed in other sectors
of the economy across Russia's regions in 1990–1992
1990 1991 1992
Karelian 3.56 3.75 4.13
Republic of Komi 6.50 6.89 6.97
Archangelskaya Oblast 3.27 3.35 3.65
Vologodskaya Oblast 3.89 4.00 4.05
Murmanskaya Oblast 4.00 4.38 5.31
St-Petersburg 7.94 8.48 8.59
Leningradskaya Oblast 6.48 6.59 6.78
Novgorodskaya Oblast 5.55 5.81 6.26
Pskovskaya Oblast 4.58 4.88 5.22
Bryanskaya Oblast 2.37 2.50 2.74
Vladimirskaya Oblast 4.34 4.48 4.73
Ivanovskaya Oblast 4.98 5.20 5.57
Kaluzhskaya Oblast 4.56 4.58 4.77
Kostromskaya Oblast 3.94 5.41 7.07
Moscow 8.78 9.58 8.77
Moscovskaya Oblast 5.45 5.81 5.62
Orlovskaya Oblast 1.55 1.70 1.90
Ryazanskaya Oblast 3.47 3.62 3.88
Smolenskaya Oblast 3.00 3.17 3.46
Tverskaya Oblast 3.91 4.14 4.36
Tulskaya Oblast 3.35 3.48 3.69
Jaroslavskaya Oblast 5.39 5.48 5.54
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Continued from p. 45
1990 1991 1992
Republic Marii El 4.00 4.07 4.35
Ìîrdoviya 1.34 1.49 1.72
Chuvashiya 1.98 2.08 2.30
Kirovskaya Oblast 2.55 2.83 3.22
Nizhegorodskaya Oblast 2.82 2.92 3.00
Belgorodskaya Oblast 2.21 2.44 2.50
Voronezhskaya Oblast 2.00 2.10 2.21
Kurskaya Oblast 2.25 2.35 2.51
Lipetskaya Oblast 1.55 1.65 1.76
Tambovskaya Oblast 2.50 2.59 2.69
Republic of Kalmykiya 3.92 5.22 6.47
Tatarstan 5.12 5.29 5.14
Astrahanskaya Oblast 6.58 6.99 7.47
Volgogradskaya Oblast 4.10 4.27 4.43
Penzenskaya Oblast 1.98 2.17 2.51
Samarskaya Oblast 4.61 4.80 4.84
Saratovskaya Oblast 5.01 5.22 5.34
Ylyanovskaya Oblast 3.58 3.63 3.71
Àdyheya 0.38 0.75
Dagestan 4.00 4.07 4.41
Kabardino-Balkarskaya 5.94 6.13 6.61
Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya 0.13 0.26
Osetiya 5.23 6.16 7.85
Krasnodarskiy Kray 5.52 5.73 5.66
Stavropolskiy Kray 5.78 5.98 6.13
Rostovskaya Oblast 8.67 8.97 9.66
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1990 1991 1992
Bashkotorstan 4.33 4.47 4.59
Udmurtiya 3.95 4.06 4.57
Kurganskaya Oblast 3.58 3.78 4.10
Orenburskaya Oblast 3.43 3.63 3.86
Permskaya Oblast 3.80 4.07 4.39
Sverdlovskaya Oblast 5.14 5.55 5.76
Chelyabinskaya Oblast 6.25 6.35 6.46
Republic Altay 1.27 2.51
Altayskiy Kray 4.68 4.97 5.34
Kemerovskaya Oblast 3.98 4.20 4.63
Novosibirskaya Oblast 7.01 7.33 7.60
Omskaya Oblast 3.10 3.20 3.34
Tomskaya Oblast 9.23 9.73 10.71
Tumenskaya Oblast 8.34 8.70 8.55
Buryatiya 3.60 3.67 3.94
Republic of Tyva 7.02 7.19 7.90
Republic Khakassiya 0.54 1.16
Krasnoyarsky Kray 5.27 5.55 5.82
Irkutskaya Oblast 6.26 6.35 6.63
Chitinskaya Oblast 2.82 2.95 3.14
Republic Sakha 5.31 5.43 5.83
Primorskiy Kray
Khabarovskaya Oblast 5.36 6.12 6.28
Amurskaya Oblast 5.42 5.60 5.87
Kamchatskaya Oblast 10.18 10.23 10.35
Magadanskaya Oblast 10.13 15.68 18.61
Sahalinskaya Oblast 7.75 8.18 8.18
Kaliningradskaya Oblast 5.50 5.51 5.66
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A3. Wage funds in co-operatives and new
enterprises in current prices 1990–1992
Wagk90 Wagek91 Wsmall91 MeanW91 Wk92 Wsm92 MeanW92
Karelian 5422 6102 6363 6232 75920 45704 60812
Republic of Komi 6915 9949 6961 8455 97349 82015 89682
Archangelskaya
Oblast 3140 5515 4318 4917 42180 39457 40819
Vologodskaya
Oblast 4828 7769 5425 6597 79145 57590 68368
Murmanskaya
Oblast 4560 6585 5852 6218 56376 58991 57684
St-Petersburg 4811 4758 3390 4074 27085 26203 26644
Leningradskaya
Oblast 4059 5976 4877 5427 40150 31905 36028
Novgorodskaya
Oblast 4392 5815 4948 5381 37192 32502 34847
Pskovskaya
Oblast 4555 7579 5555 6567 45474 39781 42627
Bryanskaya
Oblast 5064 5966 4546 5256 26267 27983 27125
Vladimirskaya
Oblast 4366 5588 4425 5006 42601 35627 39114
Ivanovskaya
Oblast 4716 5535 4177 4856 37470 37932 37701
Kaluzhskaya
Oblast 3998 5234 4458 4846 27438 30050 28744
Kostromskaya
Oblast 4858 6685 4332 5509 41909 39535 40722
Moscow 5109 4812 3048 3930 26663 27753 27208
Moscovskaya
Oblast 4680 4232 3692 3962 39286 24111 31698
Orlovskaya
Oblast 4305 6372 5240 5806 32172 38353 35262
Ryazanskaya
Oblast 4416 3955 3781 3868 25561 28422 26992
Smolenskaya
Oblast 5254 6140 3244 4692 42514 37064 39789
Tverskaya
Oblast 4360 6854 4658 5756 49085 37397 43241
Tulskaya
Oblast 4553 6667 4425 5546 44424 30165 37294
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Wagk90 Wagek91 Wsmall91 MeanW91 Wk92 Wsm92 MeanW92
Jaroslavskaya
Oblast 4433 2099 3976 3038 36232 13667 24950
Republic
Marii El 3892 5814 4845 5329 30992 3045 17018
Ìîrdoviya 4918 6238 4123 5180 35411 31968 33690
Chuvashiya 3826 5250 4595 4923 30991 30795 30893
Kirovskaya
Oblast 4201 6791 4033 5412 53384 39239 46311
Nizhegorodskaya
Oblast 5883 6013 4208 5111 59967 32668 46317
Belgorodskaya
Oblast 5125 5817 4265 5041 50684 36246 43465
Voronezhskaya
Oblast 4724 4603 4754 4678 25716 36364 31040
Kurskaya
Oblast 4459 6620 4935 5778 35465 43607 39536
Lipetskaya
Oblast 5269 6639 5197 5918 37521 40748 39134
Tambovskaya
Oblast 5515 7017 4612 5814 44668 32029 38348
Republic
of Kalmykiya 4771 5590 6215 5903 38247 30769 34508
Tatarstan 3953 5561 3852 4707 52727 39523 46125
Astrahanskaya
Oblast 3853 5007 4176 4591 29124 29014 29069
Volgogradskaya
Oblast 5114 6236 4235 5236 36729 35255 35992
Penzenskaya
Oblast 5534 6067 4263 5165 32667 17702 25185
Samarskaya
Oblast 4899 5037 3969 4503 33854 37921 35887
Saratovskaya
Oblast 4162 5013 1513 3263 31320 27757 29539
Ylyanovskaya
Oblast 4764 5780 4985 5383 35781 39731 37756
Àdyheya 3804 3761 3782 38340 27198 32769
Dagestan 2748 2863 2794 2829 16341 19413 17877
Kabardino-
Balkarskaya 3802 4761 2908 3834 30320 23189 26754
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Continued from p. 49
Wagk90 Wagek91 Wsmall91 MeanW91 Wk92 Wsm92 MeanW92
Karachaevo-
Cherkesskaya 5603 5210 5407 26206 30584 28395
Osetiya
3620 3620 4837 4229 17274 27728 22501
Krasnodarskiy
Kray 4028 4193 3952 4073 34609 40619 37614
Stavropolskiy
Kray 4257 5966 4849 5407 35526 33196 34361
Rostovskaya
Oblast 3468 6043 4341 5192 58413 35124 46769
Bashkotorstan 4461 6059 4677 5368 62607 45246 53927
Udmurtiya 4270 7975 4923 6449 41340 32577 36958
Kurganskaya
Oblast 5343 7633 5723 6678 58598 43790 51194
Orenburskaya
Oblast 4960 7166 4477 5821 53385 42651 48018
Permskaya
Oblast 4311 5040 4347 4693 44669 104180 74425
Sverdlovskaya
Oblast 4600 7127 4664 5896 72756 42408 57582
Chelyabinskaya
Oblast 4592 7077 4676 5876 54134 42740 48437
Republic Altay 6743 4320 5532 32150 34501 33326
Altayskiy Kray 5045 7118 5387 6253 49025 38659 43842
Kemerovskaya
Oblast 4946 2041 5806 3923 49791 59684 54737
Novosibirskaya
Oblast 4860 6293 4447 5370 37317 42643 39980
Omskaya
Oblast 5433 5989 7384 6686 44856 41854 43355
Tomskaya
Oblast 4998 7356 4942 6149 65973 65380 65676
Tumenskaya
Oblast 6808 2710 7767 5238 109620 106693 108157
Buryatiya 4421 6750 5507 6129 44759 39930 42344
Republic of Tyva 4527 5101 4273 4687 41453 131615 86534
Republic
Khakassiya 6810 5519 6165 44993 62014 53504
APPENDICES 51
Continued from p. 50
Wagk90 Wagek91 Wsmall91 MeanW91 Wk92 Wsm92 MeanW92
Krasnoyarsky
Kray 4399 5682 6424 6053 49864 64907 57386
Irkutskaya
Oblast 5324 5257 5083 5170 42831 43490 43160
Chitinskaya
Oblast 4904 7237 5403 6320 177925 42384 110155
Republic Sakha 7863 8752 7765 8258 75956 69353 72654
Evreyskaja
avtonomnaja
oblast 55277 55337 55307
Chukotskiy
avtonomniy
okrug 119225 59613
Primorskiy Kray 10950 9977 10463 78969 57625 68297
Khabarovskiy
kray 5812 7706 6679 7193 63640 53089 58364
Amurskaya
Oblast 5085 8177 6569 7373 62201 60752 61476
Kamchatskaya
Oblast 5540 9135 8000 8568 57505 61896 59701
Magadanskaya
Oblast 8755 11178 9659 10419 123759 66508 95134
Sahalinskaya
Oblast 7069 11035 8489 9762 89553 67045 78299
Kaliningradskaya
Oblast 4205 5444 3729 4586 54123 28693 41408
Wagk90, Wagek91, Wk92 — Wage funds in co-operatives in 1990–1992.
Wsmall91, Wsmall92 — Wage funds in small firms in 1991–1992.
MeanW91, MeanW92 — Average wage funds in co-operatives and small firms in1991–1992.
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